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ABSTRACT
"Fertility and Savings in a Two-Period Household Model:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis"

An attempt is made in this paper to develop a two-period model of
a rural household in a less-developed country in which the savings and
fertility decisions are treated as jointly-determined parental decisions
influenced by a conn:non set of prices, wages, and fixed factors.

The

implications from the theoretical model are then tested with 1970-71
household survey data from India.

The results generally lend support

to a model of joint fertility-savings determination.

In particular,

the effect of the interest rate on fertility is observed to be
significant and positive, implying a wealth effect of an increase in
the interest rate that dominates the substitution effect.

The effect

of wages earned by children on savings is, however, observed to be
negative, indicating that parents substitute children for physical
savings as child wages increase.

The model generally indicates the

importance of prices and wages in the fertility and savings decisions
of Indian rural households.

INTRODUCTION

The relations hip between savings and fertility has long been a
subject of interest and empirical investiga tion.

However, most

empirical studies have either been macro-mo delling simulatio n
exercises that have typically assumed (rather than estimated ) certain
effects of fertility on savings and capital formation (Coale and
Hoover, 1958; Enke, 1960; Simon, 1976) or household -level studies that
have treated fertility and income as exogenous variables affecting the
household 's rate of capital accumulat ion (Peek, 1974; Mueller, 1976).
An exception is a study by Kelley (1980) which uses household data
from Kenya to investiga te the relations hip between fertility and
savings by explicitl y recognizi ng both variables and household income
to be endogenou s to the household 's decisions .
Although the study by Kelley is an improvement over the other
studies in this area, it has several shortcomi ngs that limit its
usefulnes s to policy.

Kelley does not present a theoretic al model of

the Kenyan household , so it is difficult to interpret his empirical
results.

Furthermo re, he estimates a structura l savings equation in

which number of children and income -- both endogenou s variables -
appear as regressor s.

Although the equation is estimated by two-stage

least squares, which provides consisten t estimates of the effect of
fertility on savings, holding children' s contribut ion to household
income constant, it is not in the spirit of joint fertility- savings
1

determina tion.

Knowing that the number of children in a household

does or does not affect household savings is of little policy
significa nce if fertility is a household decision variable.

What is

important is to estimate the joint effect of exogenous policy
variables on both fertility and savings.

In Kelley's model, parents•

age and education are about the only exogenous variables which enter
the fertility and income equations and thus indirectl y the savings
equation.
In this paper, a theoretic al two-perio d model of a rural household
in a less-deve loped country (LDC) is developed in which fertility and
savings are treated as jointly-de termined parental decision variables .
The phenomena of young children contribut ing to household income and
of the old age security motive for having children -- factors unique
to LDCs -- are explicitl y considere d in the model.

The reduced-f orm

demand equations for children and savings, which have as their
arguments parents• wage rates and education , children' s wage rates,
market prices of consumpti on goods, rates of return on savings, and
ownership of land, are then estimated using 1970-71 survey data on
over 1,000 household s from all over India.

The empirical results lend

support to a model of joint fertility- savings determina tion.

The two

effects that are unique to such a model -- viz., the interest rate
effect on fertility and the child wage effect on savings -- are both
hig~ly significa nt.

The results also show that, while savings and

fertility move in the same direction in response to changes in the
father's wage rate and education , the interest rate, and ownership of
2

land, they move in opposite direction s in response to changes in other
exogenous variables such as the mother's wage rate, child wage rates,
and the price of consumpti on goods.

There is thus no clear (gross)

substituta bility/com plementa rity relations hip between the two decision
variables .
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THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Any exercise to model the joint

fertility-savings decisions of

rural households in LDCs must satisfy two requirements.

First, it

must be a multi-period model which explicitly incorporates the
parental motive to save.

Second, it must recognize the fact that,

besides providing parents with utility, children in traditional
agriculture begin contributing to household income at a fairly young
age (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).
·does not diminish as they grow older.

The responsibility of children
In fact, parents depend almost

entirely on their (grown-up) children for their consumption needs in
old age.

In this sense, children are substitutes for parental

savings, since both provide parents with security in old age.
The model developed below satisfies both of the above requirements.
It considers two time periods in household decision-making. 1

Parents

derive utility from the children they have in the first period and
their own standards of living in both periods.

In the first period,

both parents and children work, and the resulting family income is
spent in child-related consumption, non-child related parental
consumption, and savings.

Since parents do not work in the second

period, their consumption is financed by the returns from their first
period savings and the income contribution of their children.
Formally, it is assumed that parents maximize a utility function

4

(1)

U1 >

0,

U 11 < 0,

composed of three commodities: number of children in the first period
(N ), parental consumption in the first period (c 1), and parental
1

consumption in the second period_(C2).
Children are 'produced' according to a linear homogenous production
function

where~

are goods inputs used in the production of children and TFN

is the time contribution of the mother in producing children.

It is

assumed that the father's time does not play a role in child
production.
Parents maximize the utility function in (1) subject to an income
constraint in both the periods.

The first-period income constraint is

(3)

where~ is the market price of goods used in producing children; p 1
is the price of parental consumption goods in period 1; wM' wF, and

w~

are the first-period wage rates of the husband, wife, and children,
respectively;~ and tFN

are the marginal (or average) input

coefficients of goods and female time used in the household production
of children; TMW is the time worked by the husband (assumed to be
predetermined);

n is the total non-leisure time available to the wife

for work and child production activities; t~ is the marginal work
5

contributio n ·of a child (assumed to be fixed); Y is unearned income
1
in period l; and s is household savings in period 1.
1
The second-peri od budget constraint can be written as
(4)

=

+

is the price of consumption goods in period 2, wN is the wage
2
rate of children in the second period, t 2 is the marginal work
.
NW

where p

2

contributio n of each child in the second period (assumed to be fixed),
r is the rate of return on savings, Y is exogenous income in period
2
2, and o is the proportion of children's second-peri od income remitted

to parents (also assumed to be fixed).
To keep the·model tractable, several simplifying assumptions have
been maintained.

For instance, the wife's leisure decisions, as well

as the husband's labor supply decisions, are assumed to have been made
prior to the savings-fe rtility decisions.

The wife is thus faced with

a choice of spending her non-leisure hours in child production or
market work.

Similarly, it is assumed that the marginal work

contributio n of each child is given and fixed in both periods.
Finally, one could imagine that the proportion of children's second
period income remitted to parents is also fixed institution ally.

All

of these variables could have been endogenized without changing the
basic structure of the model or its predictions , but this would have
made the model far less tractable.

Since the focus of this paper is

on the fertility and savings decisions of parents, and not on the
6

family labor supply decisions, the above assumptions are not
unreasonable.
Maximization of (1) subject to (3) and (4) leads to the following
Lagrangean expression:
(5)

L

N 1
U(_N1 ,c1 ,c 2 ) + A{wM1'MW + WF~ + w \~J'll + Y +
1
1

=

N2
-1
-1
cSw2~1 (l+r)
+ y2 (l+r)
- Pti'fi~Nl - wFtFNNl -

in which the income constraints of both periods have been collapsed
into one present-value-of-incom e constraint.

The necessary conditions

for an interior maximum of (5) are:
(6)

aL/oNl

= oU/aN l

- A{~~ + wFtFN

~~ (l+r)-1}

=

(7)

oL/oC

1

= au/ac 1

- AP 1

(8)

a1/a c2

= au/ac 2

- ).p2 (l+r)

(9)

oL/o). = 0

=>

=

- J1~ -

0,

0,

=

0, and

present-value-of-incom e constraint.

Equation (6) implies that the shadow price of children (~A) is
oN.
1
positively related to the price of goods used in child production and
the mother's wage rate, but is negatively ~elated to the present value
of the income contribution of each child in the first and second
periods.

Equations (7) and (8) imply that the shadow price of
7

consumption in each period is equal to the price or discounted price
of consumption goods in that period.
We have totally differentia ted the first-order conditions in
equations (6)-(9) to solve for the effects of infinitesim al changes in
the exogenous variables on the three endogenous variables: N , c , and
1
1
2
c .
The signs of these effects provide some empirically testable
2
hypotheses.

However, additional structure has had to be imposed on

the model to derive any testable hypotheses.

In particular, strong

contemporan eous and intertempor al separabilit y -- implying zero cross
partial derivatives -- has been imposed on the utility function.3
Defining Das the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix and D .
1J
.
as the minor of the i,jth element of the matrix, and using the results
of the comparative static analysis ,4 the following expressions can be
written for the uncompensat ed derivatives in the system~

(10)

dN/dY

1 =

o,

>

-D42/D
(-)

(11)

dN/dY 2

=

-

(l+r)

-1

(D

42

/D)

>

o,

(-)

(12)

N

dN/dw

1

=

1

->-1m,

-

(D22/D)

1
Nl 1m, (D42/D)

(-)

(13)

dN/dwM =

>

(-)

-TMW (D42/D)

>

o,

(-)

(14)

dN/dwF =

>..tm (D22 /D)

8

+ ( t ~ l - ~)(D42/D)

o,

(15)

=

Aow ~2
2

(l+r) -2 (D /D) + A(D /D)(l+r) -2 22
32
s (n /n) (l+r) -2
1
42

= Aow 2~

(l+r)

-2

(D22 /D) +

A(D

(-)

32

/D)(l+r) -2 +

(-)

s1 (dN1/dY2)

<

o,

if sl<0,

(+)
(16)

dN

/dp
1
1

(-)

(17)

dC /dY
1 1

>
<

= - A(D 12 /D) + c1 (D /D)
42
= n41 /D

o,

(-)

0,

>

(+)
(18)

dC /dY •
1 2

n41 /D (l+r) -1

o,

>

(+)

>
<

(19)

(20)

dC,/dw.....
=
n
.&.

Tur.T
.i·.u•

(D,_,/D)
r+ J.

>

0,

0,

(+)

=

-A~ (D21 /D)

+ TFW (n /D)
41

(-)

>

0,

(+)

(22)
I

s (1+r) -1 (D /D)
1
41

>

< 0,

(+)

(23)

dC/dpl = _ A(D 11 /D)

-

(-)

C-1 (D4 /D)
(+)
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>
<

o,

Most of the derivatives in equations {10)-(23) cannot be signed
unambiguously because of the usual problem of opposite substitution
and income effects.

The derivative dN1 /dw~ is an exception, since an

increase in the first-period child wage has positive own substitution
as well as income effects.

Since there is no substitution effect of

the father's wage (because of our assumption that father's time does
not contribute to child production), its effect on fertility is a pure
income effect and hence positive.

The effect of the mother's wage on

first-period consumption is also unambiguously positive, because both
the income and the substitution effects are positive.

The positive

substitution effect arises from the fact that an increase in the
mother's wage increases the shadow price of children and thereby
increases first-period consumption.6
Of special interest are the two derivatives, dN /dr and dc tdJ1.,
1
1
which are unique to this study. The derivative dN /dr cannot be
1
signed unambiguously, again because of a positive (future) income
effect.

The first right=han~d side term in equati~n (15) reflects the

fact that an increase in the interest rate increases the shadow price
of children (thereby reducing desired fertility) by lowering the
present discounted value of children's earnings.

(Recall that the

shadow price of children is negatively related to the present
discounted value of children's earnings.}

The second term in equation

(15) is also negative because an increase in the interest rate lowers
:

the shadow price of second-period parental consumption
(TIC

2

= p2 (1+r)

-1

) and thereby desired fertility (since fertility
10

and second-period parental consumption are net substitutes by
assumption).

The third term in equation (15) reflects the positive

(second-period) income effect of an increase in the interest rate on
fertility among net savers.

An

increase in the rate of return on

savings increases the future income of net saver households (i.e.,
households with s 1>0), which in turn increases desired fertility
(ruling out inferiority of children).

However, for net borrower

households (i.e., those with s <0), an increase in the interest rate
1
reduces future income (i.e., income in the second period) and thereby
I

desired fertility.

Hence, for these households, the effect of the

interest rate on fertility can be signed as unambiguously negative.
The effect of first-period child wages on first-period parental
consumption, dC /dwN , is also ambiguous, because an increase in the
1
1
former has a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect
on first-period parental consumption (a compensated increase in child
wages reduces the shadow price of children and thereby desired first
period parental consumption).

Thus, neither of the effects that are

unique to a joint fertility-savin gs model can be signed a priori.
So far we have been concerned only with first-period parental
consumption and not with savings.

Since a savings equation will be

estimated empirically, we need to make comparative static predictions
about the effect of changes in the exogenous variables on s . The
1
derivative ds /d.Z (where Z is any exogenous variable) can be signed on
1
the basis of the signs of dN /d.Z and dc /d.Z, using the first-period
1
1
11

income constraint in equation (3).

Differentiating equation (3) with

respect to Zand rearranging terms, we have
(24)

=

Thus, ds 1;az can be signed unambiguously only if both dN /az and
1
dc 1 ;az can be signed. From equations (10)-(23), we know that only the
effects of Y , Y , and wM (all positive) can be signed for both N and
1 2
1
c1 . It is, however, obvious from equation (24) that ds /dY , as /dY ,
1
1
1
2
and as 1 /d~ cannot be signed unless
pN~ - wFtFN (i.e., each

J{tJw -

child's marginal income contribution in the first period less marginal
cost in the first period) is negative.

If the latter is negative,

The comparativ~ static analysis thus suggests estimation of the
following reduced-form household demand equations:
(28)

r, Y ),
1

+

(29)

Comparative static predictions of the signs of various effects are
indicated below each coefficient in equations (28) and (29).

Note

that all the exogenous variables in the model have not been included
in the equations, since data on future child wages, future exogenous
income, future price of consumption goods, and the price of goods used
in child production can rarely, if ever, be obtained from cross
sectional household surveys.
12

THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Equations {28) and (29) have been estimated using data collected
from an all-India sample survey of 4,118 rural households. 7 The
survey, called the Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS), was
undertaken by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New
Delhi, in three rounds: 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71.8 With the
exception of data on savings, the information used in this paper comes
entirely from the third, more extensive round.
Translation of the theoretical model into an empirically estimable
model is rendered somewhat difficult by the facts that (i) the cross
sectional survey data include households at varying stages of their
life-cycle, and (ii) both fertility and savings have strong life-cycle
patterns.

Before using these variables in the analysis, they need to

be purged of their life-cycle components.

For instance, in the case

of fertility or children ever born to the wife of the household head
(N 1), an adjustment is required for the wife's age, since the sample
includes several households in which the head's wife had not completed
her child-bearing period. 9 We have used the index proposed by Boulier
and Rosenzweig (1978), which is a ratio of the actual to the potential
number of live births.

The latter is taken from Coale and Trussell

(1974), who construct an age-specific natural fertility schedule from
birth rate data for ten non-contracepti ng populations.
Since no standard or natural age profile of household savings
exists, the age adjustment for savings (s ) is more difficult. 10 The
1
13

procedure followed here is to estimate a cohort-sp ecific age (of the
head) profile of household savings (somewhat akin to the age-coho rt
profile of individua l earnings estimated by Haley (1976)}, and use
this to construct a measure of life cycle-adj usted savings.

(See

Appendix Table A-1 for the estimates of the age-coho rt profile of
savings.}

The latter expresses actual savings as a proportio n of

•normal' savings (as defined by the estimated age profile} for a
household with

a head of a given age and cohort.

The availabil ity of

panel data {for three years} on savings has allowed us to separate the
cohort of head effect from the age of head effect on savings.

As is

observed from Appendix Figure A-1, the separatio n of the cohort effect
is important because younger cohorts tend to have age profiles of
savings that are higher and flatter than those of older cohorts.
Several of the explanato ry variables in the model also need
correctio n before being used in the savings and fertility regressio ns.
Daily wage rates for the head, his wife, and their children (~, wF,

w11)

are not available directly from the ARIS survey, but have to be

calculate d by dividing annual earnings by annual days worked -- a
procedure that is known to introduce a potential source of measurem ent
error.

Further, since wages can be calculate d only for persons

working one or more days in a year, the use of actual wages would
result in the exclusion of all non-worki ng persons from the sample.
This would not only reduce the sample size drastical ly (relative ly few
household s have working fathers, mothers, and children} , but also
introduce truncatio n bias in the estimates of the fertility and
14

savings equations.
in the analysis.

It is, therefore, desirable to use predicted wages
We have estimated separate wage equations for the

household head and his spouse, using the sample of households
reporting wages for the husband or wife.
used to construct predicted wages.

These equations have been

Since almost one-half of the wives

in the sample reported no work during the year, the wage regression
for the wife includes a linear correction term -- due to Olsen (1980)
-- for the potential selectivity bias that arises when using a non
random sample such as workers.

The male and female wage regression

results, as well as the regression results for the probability of
observing the wife's wage (which is used to construct the Olsen
correction term in the female wage equation), are shown in Appendix
Tables A-2, A-3, and A-4.

Interestingly, the female wage equation

results confirm the presence of significant selectivity bias.

They

suggest that, holding all their characteristics constant, the imputed
wage rate for a non-working woman may be more than twice as large as
that for a working woman.
The wage equation for children has been estimated over the entire
sample of working children, and includes child-, family-, and
community-specific characteristics as regressors.
A-6.)

(See Appendix Table

Since the correction term for selectivity was not significant

in the children's wage equation, the wage rate equation without the
selectivity correction term has been used to obtain predicted child
wages.

To arrive at a household- (instead of child-) specific measure

of children's wage rate, predicted child wages have been averaged over
15

all the children in a household.
The average interest rate paid by a household on all operational
(farm and business) borrowings has been u~ed as a proxy for the rate
of return on savings (r).

Since a large number of sample households

did not report interest rates, an interest rate function, regressed
over a set of household-, village-, and district-level
characteristics, has been estimated for households reporting interest
rates, and fitted values of this function have been used in the
savings and fertility regressions.

(See Appendix Table A-8.)

The

same technique used to correct for selectivity bias in the wife's wage
equation has been used here.

The correction term is significant, and

suggests that, holding other factors and the interest rate constant,
the imputed interest 1-ate may be as much as 50 per cent higher for

households who do not borrow in the market than for households who do
borrow and report interest rates.
The price of parental consumption goods in the first period (p ) is
1
proxied by the state-level Consumer Price Index for Agricultural
Laborers (ALCPI), published by the Government of India (1975).
Although the basket of commodities used to derive this index includeds
several goods used in child production, the ratio of parental
consumption to child-related consumption goods in the basket is likely
to be so large that one can safely treat the ALCPI as a proxy for p1
rather than for%·

16

As the quality of the unearned income variable in the ARIS file is
poor, we use the amount of land owned by a household as a proxy for
.
.
he f'irst perio
. d ( Y ) . 1l Te
h remaining
. .
. bl es
non-wage income
int
varia
1
appearing as regressors in the savings and fertility equations are
control variables that could reflect differences in tastes across
households.

These are the education of the household head and his age

and age squared.

Since education of the household head already enters

as a reg~essor in the head's wage rate equation, it will reflect a
pure taste or technology (in child production) effect in the savings
and fertility equations, and be purged of its wage effect.

Similarly,

the age of the head and age squared variables will reflect
taste/technology differences across households and not any life-cycle
effects, since the fertility and savings measures used in the
empirical model have already been purged of their life-cy~le
components.

17

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

The means and standard deviation s of the variables used in the
analysis are reported in Table 1.

Since Equations (28) and (29) form

a system of reduced-fo rm equations having an identical set of
exogenous variables as regressor s, they can be estimated consisten tly
and efficient ly by OLS-IV estimatio n.
are reported in Table 2.

The OLS-IV regressio n results

The comparatt ve static predictio ns of the

signs of the uncompen sated price effects are all borne out by the
empirical results.

In particula r, the first-per iod husband's and

children' s wage rates and land ownership are observed to have positive
and statistic ally significa nt effects on fertility .
The mother's wage rate is observed to have a negative and
significa nt effect on fertility , indicatin g a large and dominant
substitut ion effect of female wages on fertility .

This is a standard

result obtained by De Tray (1972), Schultz {1972), Gardner {1973), and
Turchi (1975), among others, using U.S. data, and by Rosenzweig and
Evenson (1977) using Indian district- level data. 12

Education of the

head has a puzzling positive and significa nt sign in the fertility
equation, implying that educated men either have a preferenc e for
larger families or are more 'efficien t' at producing children with
given levels of goods and time inputs.
With the exception of the age of the head and age squared
variables , all the explanato ry variables in the savings equation are
18

Table 1
Mean and Standard Deviations, Rural Indian Households, 1970-71
(Sample Size a 1018)

Variable

RELFERTL

Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Children ever born to wife of house
hold head relative to natural fertility
at her age
0.47

0.19

Average annual saving (income less
consumption expenditure) over period
1968-69 to 1970-71 divided by predicted annual saving given age and
cohort of household head

1.25

2.57

Predicted daily wage rate of the head

3.07

1.27

Predicted daily wage rate of the
spouse of the head

1.72

1.31

Average of predicted daily wage
rate for all children (below 15)
in the household

1.64

3.03

10.52

2.25

205.31

18.39

Years of education completed by the
head

5.72

4.43

AGEHD

Age (in completed years) of the head

47.86

11.55

AGEHDSQ

Age of head squared

2423.87

1181.30

I.ANDOWN

Hectares of land owned by the
household

1.30

3.54

RELSAVNG

AVCWAGE+

INTEREST+

ALCPINDX
YRSEDllliD

Predicted interest rate paid by
household on all operational
borrowings taken during 1970-71
Agricultural Laborers' Consumer
Price Index (varies by state only)

+Instrumental variables.

See Appendix B for details of the wage and interest
rate reg~essions as well as the estimated cohort-age profile of saving.
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Table 2
OLS-IV Regressions of Savings and Fertility, Rural India Households, 1970-71

Independent Variable
INTERCEPT

Relative Fertility
(RELFERTL)
0.518

(t-statistics in 2arentheses)
Relative Saving
(RELSAVNG)
-4.220

HDWAGE+

0.011 [0.074]
(1. 8)

0.574
(7.5)

[1.408]

SPWAGE+

-0.019 [-0.07]
(-3. 7)

0.133
(2 .1)

[0.183]

AVCWAGE+

0.005 [0.016]
(2. 2)

-0.105
(-4.1)

(-0.138]

INTEREST+

0.010 [0.228]
(3.6)

0.055
(1.6)

[O .462]

0.016
(4.0)

[2.616]

0.072
(3.2)

[0.329]

ALCPINDX
YRSEDUHD
AGEHD
AGEHDSQ (XlOOO)

LANDOWN
F-Ratio
R-Square
df

-0.000
(-0. 6)
0.007 [0.082]
(3. 7)
(-LO)

-0.030
(-0. 7)

-0.004
(-0.1)

0.277
(O. 7)

-0.003

0.005 [0.015]
(3.2)
11.50
0.093

0.109
(5.2)

[0.113]

30.39
0.213
1008

1008

+Instrumental variable.
Figures in brackets are elasticities evaluated at the sample mean. Elasticiies
have -been computed only for coefficients significantly· different from zero ~t
the 0.10 level of significance.
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significa nt.

Savings are observed to be highly (positive ly) elastic

with respect to the head's wage rate and with respect to the price of
parental consumpti on goods.

The elasticit y of savings with respect to

the interest rate is also positive, although less than unity.

While

the theoretic al model does not actually predict the signs for any of
these elasticit ies, conventio nal wisdom suggests positive income,
interest rate, and consumer price level effects on savings.

It is

reassurin g to find the empirical results supportin g this wisdom.
In a sense, the two most important price elasticit ies in the model
are the elasticit y of savings with respect to the (first-per iod) child
wage and the elasticit y of fertility with respect to the interest
rate.

These are the elasticit ies that are unique to a model of joint

fertility- savings determina tion.

The theoretic al model does not

suggest any particula r signs for these effects (except for net
borrower household s).

Neither is there much of a literatur e in this

area which could suggest signs for these effects.

However, if both or

either of the coefficie nts are observed to be not significa ntly
different from zero, there would little support for a model of joint
fertility- savings determina tion.
The results in Table 2 are reassurin g in this regard.
coefficie nts are observed to be highly significa nt.

Both

The effect of the

interest rate on fertility is positive, implying that the (future)
income effect of an increase in the interest rate dominates the
(negative ) substitut ion effect (Equation 15).
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The derivativ e of

savings with respect to the first-period child wage is, however,
negative.

As is obvious from Equation {30) below,

{30)
an observed negative ds /dw~ could imply almost any sign for the net
1
marginal contribution of a child to household income
N 1
(w1~ - PN~ - wFtFN) and the effect of child wages on
N

first-period parental consumption (dc /dw ).
1
1
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I.

CONCLUDING NOTES

In this paper, an attempt has been made to model the fertility and
savings decisions of rural household s in less-deve loped countries as
jointly-d etermine d decisions influence d by a common set of prices and
other exogenous factors.

It is argued that previous studies have

mi£speci fied the relations hip between savings and fertility by
treating the latter as an exogenous variable.
The empirical results strongly support the few predictio ns derived
from the theoretic al model.

Fertility is observed to be positivel y

related to the father's wage and the wage rates of children but
negativel y related to the mother's wage rate.

Savings are observed to

be positivel y related to the interest rate and to the father's wage
rate.

Both the coefficie nts that are unique to this study -- viz, the

interest rate effect on fertility and the child wage effect on
household savings -- are significa ntly different from zero, lending
support to a model of joint fertility- savings determina tion.

The

results suggest that, while an increase in the rate of return on
savings will increase household savings in less-deve loped countries ,
it may also result in an increase in fertility due to a strong {and
positive) income effect.

On the other hand, an increase in wage rates

earned by children may result in the substitut ion of children for
financial savings by rural parents.

The results also indicate that,

ceteris paribus, large farm household s have both larger families and
23

more savings than small farm or agricultural labor -households.

The

paper suggests the general importance of price effects in household
fertility and savings decisions.
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FOOTNOTES

1) All of the issues of interest in this paper can be studied as
readily in a simple two-period framework as in a full (and far less
tractable) life-cycle model of the household.
2) The comparative static derivatives have been computed with
respect to only those exogenous variables for which data are
available.
3) The separabilit y assumption is not unrealistic given the level
of aggregation of the three commodities . Also, note that, although
the separabilit y assumption implies that fertility, parental
consumption in the first period, and parental consumption in the
second period are net substitutes for each other, there is no
implication for the net substitutab ility/compl ementarity relationshi p
between fertility and savings. The latter will depend upon a number
of other factors, including the net contributio n of children to
household income.
4) The detailed comparative static calculation s can be obtained
from the author.
5) Since the effects actually estimated in the empirical model are
uncompensat ed effects, the comparative static analysis is focused on
the uncompensat ed effects of the exogenous variables on fertility and
savings.
6) Note that, because of strong separabilit y of the utility
function, all three commodities -- number of children, first-perio d
parental consumption , and second-perio d parental consumption -- are
net substitutes for each other. Hence, a compensated increase in the
shadow price of children increases parental consumption in the first
period.
7) Due to missing values, the sample used in this paper is much
smaller, viz., 1018 households.
8) See Sarma {1975) for a full description of the data.
9) In extended households having two or more families living
together, only the primary family (i.e., the household head, his wife,
and their children) has been retained in our sample. Thus, only
children born to the head's wife are enumerated in the fertility
variable.
10) Two measures of savings are available from the ARIS file.
Savings, as defined by the change in the value of assets owned by a
25

household over a one-year period, has not been used here, since it
includes only changes in physical (and not financial ) assets. The
other measure of savings, viz., the differenc e between income and
expenditu re, is more comprehen sive and has been used in this paper.
11) It should, however, be realized that even this proxy is likely
to be crude, and that estimatio n of fully (income) compensa ted price
effects may be almost impossibl e (Kniesner , 1976).
12) It is interestin g to note that, even though Rosenzwe ig and
Evenson (1977} have used very different (district -level) data for a
different time-peri od (1960-61) , their estimated fertility equation is
very similar to the one estimated in this paper. They, too, have
obtained positive male wage, child wage, and land ownership effects
and negative female wage effects on fertility .
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Appendix TableA-1
OLS Estimates of the Age-Cohort Profile of Household Saving, Rural Indian
Households, 1968-69 to 1970-7la
(t-statistics in parentheses
b

Independent Variable

Equation

Intercept (b

-387342

0

)

Age of head (bl)

6494.563
(1.4)

Age of head squared (b )
2

-33.219
(-3.3)

Year of birth of head (d )

198.053

0

Year of birth of head

Year of birth of head

X

(1.8)

Age of head (d )
1

-3. 264
H.4)

X Age of head squared (d )
2

0.017
(3. 3)

F-Ratio

13.68

R-Square

0.0054

df

12499

a

Data have been pooled across over 4,000 households and three years-1968-69,
1969-70, and 1970-71.

bThe equation estimated is of the following form:
S = a + a A + a A2, where
0
1
2
a

0

= b

0

+

d C,
0

a • b + d c, and
1
1
1
a

2

= b

2

+

d

2

C.

All of these collapse into a linear equation est~mable by 0LS:
S s bO + d C + b A + d CA + b A2 + d C·A.
2
0
1
2
1
S = saving, C = birthcohort, and A= age of head.
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Appendix Figure A-1
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Appendi x Table A-2
OLS Regress ions of the Log of the Daily Wage Rate earned by the Househo ld
Head, Rural Indian Househo lds, 1970-71
(t-stati stics in parenthe ses)
Indepen dent Variable

Equatio n

Interce pt

0.143

Age of head

-0.006
(-3.4)

Years of educatio n of head

0.042
(9. 7)

Reporte d daily wage rate for male agricul tural
labor in the distric t of residenc e

0.152
(9. 3)

Percenta ge of male adults literate in the distric t

0.005
(3.1)

Percenta ge of district populat ion that is Muslim

0.009
(3.5)

Croppin g intensit y (gross cropped area as a
percenta ge of net cultivat ed area) in the
distric t

(2 .2)

F-Ratio

77.59

R-Squal' e

0.003

0.382

df

753
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Appendix Table A-3
01S Regression of the Probability of the Head's Wife Reporting a Wage Rate,
Rural Indian Households, 1970-71
Ct-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variable

Equation

Intercept

0.452
-0.005
(-7.4)

Age of wife

-0.007

Years of education of wife

(-1.8)

Whether head of household is a Muslim

-0.113
(-3.4)

Land owned by the household

-0.013
(-4. 7)

Percentage of net cultivated area
irrigated(= 0 for 'landless households)

-0.001
(-7.7)

Whether any registered factory in the village

-0.030

(-0.8)
lJhp~h2r

any small-scale industry in the village

0.073
(2.5)

-0.666

Population of the village (xlOOOOO)

(-1. 7)

21.13

F-Ratio

0.084

R-Square

1836

df
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Appendix Table A-4
OLS Regressio ns of the Log of the Daily Wage Rate earned by the Wife, Rural
Indian Household s, 1970-71
Ct-statis tics in parenthes es)
Independe nt Variable

Equation 1

Intercept

-0.517

0.107

-0.464
(-0.1)

5. 713
(1.8)

Age of wife (xl000)

Years of education of wife

Land owned by the household

0.112
(8.3)
-0.075
(-1.5)

Whether any registere d factory
in the village of residence

o. 393
(2.9)

Equation 2

0.121
(9. 2)

-0.079
(-1.6)

0.480
(3.6)

Whether any small-sca le industry 0.128
in the village
(1.4)

(O. 8)

Populatio n of the village
(x 1000000)

4.568
(3.6)

Selectivi ty Correctio n (1-;)a

3.566
(2. 7)

0.071

1.099
(2. 3)

F-Ratio
R-Square
df

25.20
0.411
253

28.09
0.399
254

a; is the predicted probabli lity of the wife reporting a wage rate,
obtained from Appendix Table A-3.
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Appendix Table A-5

OLS Regression of the Probability of a Child Reporting
a Wage Rate, Rural Indian Households, 1970-71 ~,b

,(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variable

Equation

Intercept

-0.023

Sex of child

0.009
(2. 8)

Age of child

0.005
(8.1)

Whether eldest child in the household

0.008
(2.0)

Whether head of household is a Muslim

-0.014
(-2.0)

Years of education of the household head

-0.003
(-8.3)

Land owned by the household

-0.001
(-2.0)

Whether any small-scale industry in the village

-0.007
(-1.3)

F-Ratio

30.19

R-Square

0.034

df

6038

aThe sample used for this regression includes all the children in
all households surveyed.
bEducation of the child was not included as a regressor since it is
likely to be an endogenous variable that is jointly determined with
the labor force participation of the child.
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Appendix Table A-6
OLS Regressions of the Log of the Daily Wage Rate Earned
by Children, Rural Indian Households, 1970-7la

(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variable

Equation 1

Intercept

Equation 2

-0.419
(-0.5)

-7.796
(-0. 7)

Sex of child

0.686
(2. 9)

0.751
(2. 9)

Age of child

0.057
(0.9)

0.108
(1.1)

-0.796
(-2. 5)

-0.852
(-2.6)

Whether any registered factory in the village

2.202
(4.6)

2.184
(4. 5)

Whether any small-scale factory in the village

-1.102
(-1.6)

-1.161
(-1. 6)

9.284
(2.1)

8.765
(1.9)

Land owned by the household

Population of the village (X 100000)
Selectivity Correction (1 - ;)b

7.073
(0.7)

F-Ratio

7.62

6.56

R-Square

0.281

0.284

df

117

aEducation of the child was not included as a regressor

116

because of

the possibility that it is endogenous and may, in fact, depend on the
opport1JI1ity cost of time (or the wage rate) of the child.
b--

P

is the predicted probability of the child reporting a wage rate,

obtained from Appendix TableA-5.
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Appendix Table A-7
OLS Regression of the Probability of a Household
Reporting an Interest Rate on Current Operational
Borrowings, Rural Indian Households, 1970-71

(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent Variable

Equation

Intercept

0.156

Years of education of the head

0.013

(7.5)
Age of head (X 1000)

0.010
(0.2)

Land owned by household

0.009

(2.9)
Presence of a loan cooperative in the village

0.011
(0.4)

Percentage of male adults literature in the district.

-0.002

(-2.4)
Percentage of district population belonging to
scheduled (backward) castes and tribes
Percentage of district population that is Muslim

-0.001
(-0. 7)

-0.003
(-3. 3)

F-Ratio

12.43

R-Square

0.040

df

2092
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Appendi x Table A-8
OLS Regress ions of the Log of the Interes t Rate Paid
On Current Operatio nal Holding s, Rural Indian Househo lds, 1970-71

(t-stati stics in parenth eses)
Indepen dent Variable

Equation 1

Intercep t

Equatio n 2

5.019

5.469

0.166
(1.1)

0.176
(1.2)

-0.523
(-6.3)

-0.543
(-6. 5)

0.045
(1.0)

0.044
(1.0)

Whether distric t of residenc e is an
!ADP (Intensi ve Agricul tural Develop ~ent
Program ) particip ant distric t

-0.083
(-2.0)

-0.086
(-2.0)

Percenta ge of male adults literate in the
distric t

-0.009
(-4.0)

-0.009
(-4.1)

0.003
(0.9)

0.004
(1.6)

Whether head is a Muslim
Presenc e of a loan coopera tive in the villagea
Presenc e of

a bank

in the villagea

Percenta ge of distric t populat ion that is Muslim
A

Selecti vity correcti on (1 - p}

b
0.526
(1.6)

F-Ratio

11.09

R- Square

0.203

df

305

aExclud ed category is informa l money-l enders.
b ..
p

12.44

is the predicte d probabi lity of reportin g an interes t rate,

obtained from Appendi x Table A-7.
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